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Abstract 
 
While theories of consciousness differ substantially, the ‘conscious access hypothesis’, 
which aligns consciousness with the global accessibility of information across cortical regions, is 
present in many of the prevailing frameworks.  This account holds that consciousness is necessary 
to integrate information arising from independent functions such as the specialist processing 
required by different senses.  We directly tested this account by evaluating the potential for 
associative learning between novel pairs of subliminal stimuli presented in different sensory 
modalities.  First, pairs of subliminal stimuli were presented and then their association assessed by 
examining the ability of the first stimulus to prime classification of the second.  In Experiments 1-4 
the stimuli were word-pairs consisting of a male name preceding either a creative or uncreative 
profession. Participants were subliminally exposed to two name-profession pairs where one name 
was paired with a creative profession and the other an uncreative profession.  A supraliminal task 
followed requiring the timed classification of one of those two professions.  The target profession 
was preceded by either the name with which it had been subliminally paired (concordant) or the 
alternate name (discordant). Experiment 1 presented stimuli auditorily, Experiment 2 visually, and 
Experiment 3 presented names auditorily and professions visually.  All three experiments revealed 
the same inverse priming effect with concordant test pairs associated with significantly slower 
classification judgements. Experiment 4 sought to establish if learning would be more efficient with 
supraliminal stimuli and found evidence that a different strategy is adopted when stimuli are 
consciously perceived.  Finally, Experiment 5 replicated the unconscious cross-modal association 
achieved in Experiment 3 utilising non-linguistic stimuli. The results demonstrate the acquisition of 
novel cross-modal associations between stimuli which are not consciously perceived and thus 
challenge the global access hypothesis and those theories embracing it. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Global Workspace Theory (GWT) introduced by Baars (1988) has arguably been one of 
the most influential theories of consciousness.  Its principle notion of consciousness as the 
mechanism for providing global access – permitting the integration and sharing of information 
between functions otherwise operating independently, such as specialist sensory processors – has 
been especially influential.  Indeed, there has been a convergence on this central idea among many 
of the most active researchers and theorists in the field (e.g. S. Dehaene et al., 2001; S. Dehaene, 
Sergent, & Changeux, 2003; Dennett, 2001; Edelman & Tononi, 2000; Freeman, 2003).  Here we 
present evidence that directly challenges any account that holds consciousness to be necessary for 
the integration of information arising from different sensory modalities.  We reliably demonstrate 
that new associations can be formed between subliminal stimuli perceived through separate senses.  
 Progress towards an understanding of the nature of consciousness will undoubtedly bring 
profound practical, ethical and clinical implications; it is argued by some to be one of the most 
pressing and important issues in biology (Crick, 1994; Seth, 2010).  In keeping with this, the last 
two decades has seen the study of human consciousness move from an unpopular fringe topic to 
that of a highly sophisticated mainstream research endeavour.  There now exist a number of 
different theories attempting to reconcile the burgeoning experimental data with models of 
cognitive and neurophysiological architectures (for reviews see, Dienes & Seth, 2010; Kouider, 
2009; Seth, 2007).  While theories differ considerably there is some common ground.  The 
conscious access hypothesis (Baars, 2002), whereby consciousness is aligned with the global 
accessibility of information across cortical regions, is present in many frameworks though most 
explicitly articulated in GWT.  
  The global workspace account holds that the brain comprises a network of specialised 
processors which operate to support sensory functions, motor control, etc.  These are thought to 
operate largely independently with processing taking place unconsciously.  The global workspace, 
in contrast, is proposed to be widely distributed throughout the brain, primarily through cortical 
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regions, and thus provides a mechanism by which information can be broadcast to disparate 
functional areas.  The separate specialised processes are held to compete for access to the 
workspace and hence the potential to distribute information globally.  By this account, conscious 
content at any given moment is that which resides within the global workspace and is hence 
globally available.  
 Support for GWT comes both from successful computational simulations and empirical data 
revealing global dynamics consistent with conscious experience.  A neuronal global workspace 
theory proposed by Dehaene (Dehaene, et al., 2003) incorporates oscillatory behaviour whereby 
stimulation results in a coherent global pattern of activity, momentarily inhibiting processing of new 
stimuli.  This and other neural network instantiations have successfully simulated phenomena such 
as the attentional blink, where the second of two rapidly presented stimuli fails to reach conscious 
awareness (Dehaene, et al., 2003; Raffone & Pantani, 2010).   The notion that unconscious 
processing is restricted to local sensory regions while conscious processing activates a global 
network of cortical areas also enjoys a degree of empirical support. Unconsciously perceived words 
are found to primarily activate the visual cortex while their conscious equivalents extend to 
additional parietal and prefrontal regions (Dehaene, et al., 2001).  Gamma oscillations, hypothesised 
to be a neural correlate of consciousness (Crick & Koch, 1990; Ward, 2011), reveal a similar 
pattern with subliminal words eliciting local gamma-band oscillations while consciously perceived 
words induce long-distance synchronised oscillations across distant regions (Melloni et al., 2007).  
Functional brain imaging studies reveal significantly lower metabolic activity in cortical regions, 
particularly frontal and parietal cortex, during coma and general anaesthesia relative to conscious 
waking states (Baars, Ramsoy, & Laureys, 2003). Other studies demonstrate both increased 
communication between cortical regions and corresponding increases in metabolic activity while 
new tasks are consciously acquired, which are then observed to reduce when those tasks become 
automatic (Baars, 2002; Haier et al., 1992) . 
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 A key strength of GWT has been its ability to generate specific testable predictions such as: 
that ‘unconscious input processing is limited to sensory regions’, and that ‘consciousness is needed 
to integrate multiple sensory inputs’ (Baars, 2002 p 47-48).  A reliable demonstration of the 
integration of unconsciously perceived stimuli from different sensory domains would challenge 
both predictions and thus provide evidence against GWT, at least in its original formulation, and the 
global access hypothesis more generally.  Importantly, any such demonstration needs to ensure that 
neither stimulus is within conscious contents; were one stimulus to reside within the workspace it 
could be broadcast to other sensory regions and integration arise from local processing without 
contradicting the theory.  Similarly, it is not sufficient for the process of integration to be 
unconscious but rather the stimuli themselves must not be consciously perceived.  Humans clearly 
integrate different sensory sources without being conscious of doing so.  For example, the McGurk 
effect where mismatched lip movements and spoken sounds are integrated to create an auditory 
illusion occurs without our awareness of performing that integration (McGurk & MacDonald, 
1976).  This does not present a challenge to the global access hypothesis however, as the stimuli are 
themselves consciously perceived and hence globally available to be integrated.  In the current 
paper where we refer to ‘unconscious cross-modal binding’ or ‘unconscious associative learning’, 
we mean associations which are formed without conscious perception of the stimuli, not simply 
without conscious awareness of the binding process. Interestingly, in the case of the McGurk effect 
there is evidence that integration does not occur if the lip movements are presented subliminally 
(Palmer & Ramsey, 2012).   
In principle, integration could be demonstrated either by the reactivation of existing 
associations or, more impressively, by the acquisition of new associations.  While unconscious 
associative learning has been controversial (Shanks, 2010), a growing number of studies now 
demonstrate that conditioning (Pessiglione et al., 2008; Raio, Carmel, Carrasco, & Phelps, 2012; 
Seitz, Kim, & Watanabe, 2009), the formation of simple associations (Duss, Oggier, Reber, & 
Henke, 2011; Henke, Reber, & Duss, 2013), scene analysis (Tachibana & Noguchi, 2015), and 
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sequence learning can all be achieved where (single modality) stimuli are subliminal.  Furthermore, 
in the case of sequence learning, the sequences can be relatively simple, involving only first-order 
relations (Atas, Faivre, Timmermans, Cleeremans, & Kouider, 2014), or more complex (Rosenthal, 
Andrews, Antoniades, Kennard, & Soto, 2016; Rosenthal, Kennard, & Soto, 2010).  Cross-modal 
effects where one of the stimuli is subliminal have been observed in the case of visual motion 
disambiguation (Dufour, Touzalin, Moessinger, Brochard, & Després, 2008) and cross-modal 
priming (Lamy, Mudrik, & Deouell, 2008; though see Kouider & Dupoux, 2001). There have been 
some related cross-modal findings involving olfaction.  Olfactory-visual emotion integration based 
on subthreshold negative olfactory and visual cues has been found to facilitate subthreshold visual 
perception of negative emotion (Novak, Gitelman, Schuyler & Li, 2015).  And while cross-modal 
associations between tones and odours have recently been demonstrated during sleep (Arzi et al., 
2012), the sleep state does not preclude the existence of conscious contents, which are known to be 
present both during REM and NREM stages (Tagliazucchi, Behrens, & Laufs, 2013).  As such, a 
rigorous evaluation of unconscious cross-modal cognitive integration in a waking state, where 
conscious contents can be reliably determined, is of vital theoretical importance (Mudrik, Faivre, & 
Koch, 2014).  
A very recent study provides the first evidence that such unconscious multisensory cognitive 
integration is indeed possible.  Faivre, Mudrik, Schwartz, and Koch (2014), employ a form of 
congruency priming to demonstrate that auditory and visual representations of the same number or 
letter can be integrated without awareness.  Priming with the simultaneous subliminal presentation 
of auditory and visual representations of same or different numbers facilitated conscious same-
different judgments of simultaneous presentations of same or different letters. While this 
demonstrates a form of unconscious integration it is limited to the re-activation of pre-existing, 
consciously acquired associations, namely between the auditory and visual representations of the 
same concept.  Wolf Singer (Singer, 1998) argues that we should distinguish between routine 
bindings of this sort, where neurons code for a specific combination of sensory inputs, and novel, 
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unanticipated combinations with only those novel bindings potentially dependent on a conscious 
brain state.  Here we sought to evaluate the potential for unconscious cross-modal binding of that 
latter form by evaluating the potential for associative learning of novel stimulus combinations.  
Drawing on the strengths of successful uni-modal unconscious associative learning (Duss, et al., 
2011) and cross-modal priming (Lamy, et al., 2008) demonstrations, we devised a novel paradigm 
intended to permit a sensitive test of associative learning that could be evaluated both within 
auditory and visual modalities independently, and cross-modally between them.   
Failure to observe unconscious cross-modal learning would be uninformative without first 
demonstrating that equivalent learning can be achieved within each modality independently.  
Accordingly, we start our investigation with three experiments exploring the unconscious 
associative learning of word-pairs; first for auditory-auditory pairs (Experiment 1), then for visual-
visual pairs (Experiment 2), and finally for auditory-visual pairs (Experiment 3).  The approach is 
the same in each case, beginning with establishing the subjective threshold of awareness.   
Cheesman and Merikle (1984, 1986) first distinguished between subjective and objective 
thresholds. The subjective threshold is that level at which participants believe they are performing 
at chance in making some judgement, for example indicating whether a back-masked stimulus was 
a word or non-word; the objective threshold is that level at which their responses objectively are at 
chance performance.   Cheesman and Merikle demonstrated that these thresholds were distinct, with 
some priming effects occurring below the subjective but not the objective threshold.  The appeal of 
subjective thresholds is in part because they directly index phenomenal experience (Jack & Shallice, 
2001; Merikle & Daneman, 2000; Merikle et al., 2001).  However, the use of subjective thresholds 
has been criticised on the basis that apparently earnest denials of awareness may reflect low 
confidence rather than the true absence of awareness (see, e.g. Green & Swets, 1966, pp. 335–337; 
Holender, 1986; Macmillan, 1986; Merikle, 1982).  Hence, some investigators have preferred to 
investigate subliminal effects at an objective threshold where forced-choice performance is at 
chance (e.g. Draine & Greenwald, 1998; Naccache & Dehaene, 2001; Snodgrass & Shevrin, 2006).  
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Even utilising objective methods the relationship between exposure and priming is not always 
straightforward, with some evidence that it can vary non-monotonically with SOA (Dagenbach, 
Carr, Wilhelmsen, 1989) and be subject to variations induced by the threshold setting tasks 
themselves (Carr & Dagenbach, 1990).  While there has been substantial evidence for priming 
below the objective threshold, for the most part effects have been smaller, difficult to attain and 
short lived (e.g. Draine & Greenwald, 1998; Klauer, Eder, Greenwald, & Abrams, 2007, though cf. 
Van den Bussche, Van den Noortgate, and Reynvoet (2009) who found no significant effect of 
using objective versus subjective thresholds in a meta-analysis of subliminal priming effects).  
Evidence that effects are generally weaker below the objective threshold has led to its use in 
assessing unconscious processing being heavily criticised for testing not just unconscious cognition 
but degraded unconscious cognition (Dienes, 2004, 2008; Lau & Passingham, 2006).  We maintain 
that, where possible, the choice of threshold should be motivated by theory.  In the present research 
we are seeking to test predictions of the GWT which itself motivates the use of subjective measures.   
Specifically, GWT holds that a stimulus is conscious if it exists within the global workspace and 
that anything within the workspace will be widely accessible, including accessible to report.  Hence, 
the subjective threshold optimally identifies the stimulus intensity that falls just below this 
reportable, and hence conscious level as defined by GWT.  The objective threshold would be non-
optimal as it would typically require the stimulus to be degraded further than is necessary to remove 
conscious report, as judged by the theory we are testing. According to GWT, local unconscious 
processing would allow the discrimination required for a test of the objective threshold.  Hence we 
are constrained to using the subjective threshold in this work precisely because we want to provide 
the strongest test of the conscious access hypothesis; the use of an objective threshold would be to 
adopt a weaker test that would not permit strong conclusions were learning not to be observed.   
We adopt the use of confidence ratings to identify subjective thresholds of awareness, for 
example taking the absence of any confidence in being able to discriminate words from non-words 
as indicating the absence of a conscious state of knowing what the words are. While other 
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subjective measures, such as the perceptual awareness scale (PAS; Ramsøy, & Overgaard, 2004), 
usefully gauge different types of perceptual experience, where one is seeking to evaluate whether a 
specific state of knowledge is conscious then a confidence rating paired with an appropriate 
decision choice is the more suitable approach (Dienes, Scott & Seth, 2010; Dienes & Seth, 2010).  
  After identifying the relevant subliminal threshold(s), two different name-profession pairs 
are presented subliminally, one including a creative profession and one an uncreative profession.  
The test of unconscious associative learning follows immediately after the subliminal presentation; 
participants are required to perform a speeded classification of one of the two professions which is 
consciously primed by either the name with which it was subliminally presented (concordant pair) 
or the alternative (discordant pair). Thus evidence for unconscious associative learning would be 
provided by a systematic difference in reaction times between concordant and discordant test-pairs.  
The results of these experiments demonstrate unconscious associative learning both within and 
between sensory modalities.   
Two further experiments were undertaken.  Experiment 4 set out to examine the extent to 
which the associative learning might be more efficient with conscious perception.  Experiment 5 
sought to establish whether the unconscious cross-modal associative learning achieved in 
Experiment 3 could be replicated utilising non-linguistic stimuli.  Experiment 4 found evidence that 
the task is approached in a very different way when stimuli are consciously perceived, while 
Experiment 5 successfully replicated the associative learning observed in Experiment 3 and thus 
extends our findings to include unconscious cross-modal associations between novel non-linguistic 
stimuli.   
Our results demonstrate associative learning of novel pairs of subliminal stimuli presented in 
different sensory modalities, initially illustrated for linguistic stimuli and subsequently replicated 
with non-linguistic stimuli.  These results present a challenge to GWT and the prevailing theoretical 
perspective that holds consciousness to be a requirement for the integration of multiple sensory 
inputs.  
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2. Experiment 1 
2.1 Rationale 
This first experiment sought to test whether the proposed paradigm would reveal 
unconscious associative learning in the auditory modality. 
2.2 Method 
2.2.1 Participants 
Participants included 60 volunteers (37 female) with a mean age of 24 (SD = 8.95) recruited 
by direct approach on the University of Sussex campus.  Volunteers participated in exchange for 
confectionary.  All participants were native English speakers reporting normal binaural hearing and 
were naïve to the experimental hypothesis.  Ethical approval, for this and the other experiments 
reported in this manuscript, was granted by the University of Sussex School of Psychology ethics 
committee and the studies conducted in accordance with the declaration of Helsinki. 
2.2.2 Materials 
The experiment was implemented in Matlab with the Cogent 2000 toolbox for enhanced 
timing accuracy and conducted on a laptop computer with a refresh rate of 60 Hz and the screen 
resolution set to 1024 x 768.  All instructions were presented on-screen and the auditory stimuli 
presented through Dynamode HH-660MV stereo headphones.  Auditory word stimuli were all 
uttered by the same male speaker, recorded at 32 bits and 44.1 kHz, and normalised to have the 
same peak volume; approximately 66 dBc when played at the native sound file volume. The word 
stimuli used included the numbers 1-30 together with 10 standard colour words for the auditory 
threshold finding task, and 16 profession names (8 creative, and 8 non-creative) together with 32 
male names for the final test phase.  All the words used are listed in Appendix A.  The complete set 
of materials for all five experiments and the corresponding data has been made publically available 
on the Open Science Framework and can be retrieved from osf.io/4smbx.  
2.2.3 Procedure 
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 The study was conducted in a quiet room with the experimenter present at all times.  The 
procedure consisted of four stages with instructions given on-screen. 
Stage 1, Threshold identification.  The goal of this stage was to identify the auditory 
threshold below which participants were unable to consciously discern individual words.  On each 
trial participants were played a sequence of eight randomly selected number words between one and 
thirty with a single colour word inserted at a random position between the 1st and 7th number in the 
sequence.  There was a 10 ms delay between words.  The words were played into the right 
headphone only.  Participants were instructed to listen carefully to the stream of words and to use 
the ‘y’ or ‘n’ key to indicate if they had heard a non-number word in the sequence.  If they indicated 
that they had heard a non-number word they were then asked to type it in.  The initial volume was 
that of the native sound file. This volume was then systematically increased on each subsequent trial 
by a multiple of .0005 times the initial volume until the participant correctly identified a non-
number word. Once a non-number word was correctly identified the volume was then 
systematically decreased on subsequent trials by the same volume multiple until the participant 
reported being unable to discern the non-number word on six consecutive trials. The volume at 
which this was achieved was taken to be their initial subliminal threshold. 
Stage 2, familiarisation with an attentional task.  This stage was designed to familiarise 
participants with an attentional task which would be employed in the test trials. Two pairs of colour 
words, embedded in a sequence of number words as in the first stage, would be spoken in the right 
ear at the subliminal threshold previously identified.  Each pair of colour words was made of two 
randomly selected from the ten colour words listed in Appendix A.  Each pair were repeated twice 
separated by between two and five number words, for example, <2-5 number words> ‘red yellow’ 
<2-5 number words> ‘red yellow’ <2-5 number words> ‘blue orange’ <2-5 number words> ‘blue 
orange’ <2-5 number words>.  Each word in the sequence was separated by a 10 ms pause as 
before.  While the subliminal sequence was presented to the right ear a random sequence of the 
numbers ‘one’ and ‘two’, separated by a 300 ms delay, was played to the left ear.  These were 
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played at a supraliminal volume corresponding to a volume multiple of 100 times that identified to 
be below the auditory threshold; this multiple delivered a comfortable volume easily audible by all 
participants.  Participants were informed that their task was to listen to the sequence of ones and 
twos spoken in their left ear and to press the left arrow key in response to the number ‘one’ and the 
right arrow key in response to the number ‘two’.  The need for accuracy was emphasised and a 
dynamic error count showing the number of errors or omissions was displayed on-screen.  At the 
end of each trial participants were asked if they had heard any non-number words.  Where any 
words were accurately identified the presentation volume (the volume intended to be subliminal) 
was adjusted down by a further .0005 times the initial volume.  The program proceeded to the next 
stage only when the participant had reported being unable to discern a non-number word on six 
consecutive trials.   
Stage 3, familiarisation with the profession categorisation.  On-screen instructions provided 
two lists of professions; eight labelled as ‘creative’ (relating to art or music) and eight as ‘non-
creative’, see Appendix A.  Participants studied the lists before beginning a reaction time task. On 
each trial, one of the 16 professions was spoken supraliminally through both headphones, at the 
identified supraliminal volume, with the participant required to indicate whether it was ‘creative’ or 
‘non-creative’ using the left or right arrow key respectively. The trials included all 16 professions 
repeated three times in different random orders. The need for both speed and accuracy was 
emphasised and a dynamic display showed the participant’s fastest reaction time so far and the 
number of errors made.  
Stage 4, test stage.  Each test-trial consisted of two phases, see Figure 1. In the first phase 
participants were required to perform the attention task as described in Stage 2 above; responding to 
the words ‘one’ and ‘two’ spoken into the left ear.  While performing the attention task two 
different name-profession pairs were played in the right ear at the identified subliminal threshold. 
Presentation timings were identical to those used for the pairs of colours words in stage 2. The two 
pairs always included one name paired with a ‘creative’ profession and one with a ‘non-creative’ 
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profession e.g. ‘Mike Pianist’ and ‘Paul Accountant’.  Each pair was repeated twice within a trial.  
The pairing of professions with the male names was separately randomised for each participant.  At 
the end of the subliminal sequence participants were asked to report whether they had been able to 
discern any non-number words and if so to enter them.  If they identified a non-number word the 
trial would be excluded from later analysis and the threshold further reduced for subsequent test-
trials. The second phase of each test-trial required the participant to classify a supraliminal 
profession name, as in Stage 3 above.  The profession name played would be one of the two 
profession names included in the immediately preceding subliminal presentation, half of the time 
this would be the profession from the first name-profession pair and half that from the second.   In 
contrast to Stage 3 however, the profession name was preceded by the supraliminal presentation of 
one or other of the two male names included in the subliminal presentation followed by a 10 ms 
delay.  Participants were told to ignore the spoken names and focus on classifying the professions 
quickly and accurately as before.  On half of the trials the name would be that which had been 
subliminally paired with the target profession and on half it would be that which had been paired 
with the alternate profession; thus, creating concordant and discordant pairs respectively.  There 
were 32 test-trials in total with each profession name as the target on two occasions and each male 
name serving as prime once.  
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Figure 1.  Illustration of two-phase test-trail procedure for the three experiment types.  Note, Experiments 4 and 5 follow the same format as Experiment 3 
but with different stimuli; supraliminal stimuli in Experiment 4 and non-linguistic subliminal stimuli in Experiment 5. 
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2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Bayes factors 
For hypothesis testing both p-values and Bayes factors will be reported. A Bayes factor, B, 
is a continuous measure of strength of evidence for an H1 versus H0 (Wagenmakers et al, in press; 
Dienes, 2014). While there are no sharp categories in Bayesian hypothesis testing, by convention a 
B greater than about 3 can be taken as substantial evidence for H1 over H0; a B less than about 1/3 
as substantial evidence for H0; and a B between 1/3 and 3 as indicating the data are insensitive in 
distinguishing H1 and H0 (Jeffreys, 1961). The advantage of this convention is that B > 3 and p < 
.05 will often match when the obtained mean difference is roughly that expected (Dienes, 2014; 
Jeffreys, 1961); B’s can then disambiguate non-significant results as either indicating support for 
H0 or as indicating insensitive data. A Bayes factor determines how well the data are predicted by 
H1 relative to H0; thus a rough expected size of effect is needed in order to make predictions. 
Reber, Luechinger, Boesiger, and Henke (2012) utilized a paradigm similar in that after pairs of 
words had been presented together, participants were faster to indicate semantic relatedness for 
previously related rather than unrelated pairs, by about 50 ms. This rough estimate will form the 
basis of predictions for Experiment 1 (which will provide a better prediction for subsequent 
experiments). Following Dienes (2014), the predictions of H1 will be modelled as a Normal centred 
on zero with an SD equal to the rough expected effect size (B will be notated BN(0,SD) to indicate 
how H1 was specified). As RT’s were transformed the expected value will be based on a 
transformed 50 ms effect around the midpoint of the obtained means. 
2.3.2 Pre-processing and exclusion criteria 
Note, the following pre-processing and exclusion criteria have been identically applied in all 
of the experiments.  Participants were excluded where they perceived stimuli intended to be 
subliminal on greater than 25% of trials (N = 0), or where their mean difference in reaction times 
for concordant and discordant pairs was identified as an outlier by the SPSS boxplot function (N = 
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2).  Individual trials were excluded where the participant reported detecting (in this case hearing) a 
word that resembled any word intended to be subliminal on that trial (M = 0.5%, SD = 1.3%), where 
the profession classification decision was incorrect (M = 4.7%, SD = 4.4%), or where the RT was 
shorter than 200 ms or greater than 2 SDs from the mean (M = 4.4%, SD = 2.4%).  Overall, the 
mean percentage of excluded trials was 9.4% (SD = 4.6%).  As is common for RT data the 
distribution was non-normal; this was normalised by applying a reciprocal transformation (1 / RT).  
2.3.3 Analysis 
The mean reaction times for concordant test-trials were longer than those of discordant test-
trials, t(57) = 2.81, p = .007, dz = 0.37, BN(0, 8×10
-5
) = 6.89, see Figure 2a.  The direction of this 
difference is consistent with inverse priming or what is more generally termed the negative 
compatibility effect (NCE; Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998).  This phenomenon is characterised by 
concordant primes facilitating reaction times relative to discordant primes when the delay between 
prime and target is short (typically less than 150 ms) and the relationship reversing as the delay 
becomes longer.  While the effect has most commonly been studied in the context of masked 
priming (Bowman, Schlaghecken, & Eimer, 2006; Krueger, Klapoetke, & Mattler, 2011; 
Schlaghecken, Bowman, & Eimer, 2006), it has also been demonstrated in the absence of a mask, as 
is the case for the current paradigm, (Jaskowski, 2008; Machado, Wyatt, Devine, & Knight, 2007; 
Sumner, 2008).  Machado et al. demonstrated that, in the absence of a mask, when the prime 
preceded the target by greater than a few hundred milliseconds response times were slower when 
the prime and target were associated with the same response.  The effect is attributed to the 
response to the prime needing to be inhibited during the delay between prime and target and that 
inhibition needing to be overcome when the same response is subsequently required for the target.  
The size of the effect observed by Machado et al. (11-19 ms; Exp. 1) is comparable to that observed 
in the current experiment (14 ms). In the present study the prime (male name) has been associated 
with either the target profession presented for classification, or an alternate profession requiring the 
opposite classification. An extended delay between prime and target was unavoidable due to the 
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nature of auditory stimuli; the spoken names were typically around 600 ms in duration but were 
uniquely identifiable long before completion e.g. the name Thomas lasts approximately 625 ms but 
is uniquely identifiable after as little as 200 ms.  As a result, the delay between the name prime 
being identifiable and the onset of the target would be upward of several hundred milliseconds, and 
hence consistent with timings previously shown to induce the NCE, albeit in a visual rather than 
auditory paradigm. 
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Figure 2.  Mean reaction times for classification judgements by trial type and experiment (+/- 1 SEM diff).  
Exp. 1, subliminal linguistic aural, N = 58; Exp. 2, subliminal linguistic visual, N = 55; Exp. 3, subliminal 
linguistic cross-modal, N = 60; Exp. 4, supraliminal linguistic cross-modal, N = 57; Exp. 5, subliminal non-
linguistic cross-modal, N = 52.  Note the scale reflects the difference in reciprocally transformed reaction 
times with the y-axis values converted back to milliseconds.  
 * p < .05, + p < .05 one-tailed 
 
2.4 Conclusion Experiment 1 
The reliable difference in reaction times between concordant and discordant test-trials 
demonstrates that associations were formed between the names and professions during their 
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subliminal exposure.  Experiment 1 thus demonstrates unconscious associative learning in the 
auditory domain.   
3. Experiment 2 
3.1 Rationale 
Having found evidence for unconscious associative learning in the auditory modality, 
Experiment 2 sought to replicate this in the visual modality.  A cross-modal evaluation would only 
be informative if reliable learning could first be demonstrated in both modalities.  
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Participants 
Participants included 60 volunteers (41 female) with a mean age of 22 (SD = 4.2) recruited by 
direct approach on the University of Sussex campus.  Volunteers participated in exchange for 
confectionary.  All participants were native English speakers reporting normal or corrected to 
normal vision and were naïve to the experimental hypothesis.   
3.2.2 Materials 
Materials were as for Experiment 1 with the following exceptions.  Stimuli were presented 
in written rather than auditory form; Courier New font style, font size 25. The stimuli used for the 
visual threshold finding task consisted of equal numbers of three-letter words and three-letter non-
words generated from random combinations of consonants (excluding ‘y’), see Appendix A for 
word stimuli.  During the subliminal presentation words were presented in light grey (0.9 on a 
black-white scale from 0-1; Luminance 158.8 cd/m2) on a white background (Luminance 188.1 
cd/m2) and both forward and backward masked by randomly generated black and white block 
patterns where blocks were 3x3 pixels.  The presentation of words in low contrast was a deliberate 
strategy intended to increase the duration that the stimuli could be presented without conscious 
perception. 
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3.2.3 Procedure 
The study was conducted in a quiet room with the experimenter present at all times.  The 
procedure consisted of the equivalent four stages followed in Experiment 1 but adapted for the 
visual modality.  
Stage 1, Threshold identification.  Each trial consisted of the following sequence of stimuli 
presented at fixation: a fixation cross (1000 ms), first mask (300 ms), low-contrast word or non-
word (initially 600 ms), second mask (300 ms).  After each sequence participants were required to 
indicate whether they thought a word or non-word had been presented and to indicate whether they 
had ‘some confidence’ in that judgment, or if it was a ‘guess’.   They were instructed to indicate 
‘some confidence’ if they had even the slightest idea and to only respond ‘guess’ if they genuinely 
felt they were responding randomly.  The display time was reduced each time there was a correct 
response made with confidence.  The reduction was initially 50 ms until a ‘guess’ response was 
made or the stimulus duration reached 50 ms, at which point the duration increased to the previous 
level and subsequently reduced in steps of a single screen refresh (16.67 ms).  This process 
proceeded until the participant indicated guessing on six consecutive trials at the same display 
duration; that duration was adopted as their initial subliminal threshold. 
Stage 2, familiarisation with an attentional task.  Each trial consisted of the subliminal 
presentation of two pairs of colour words, each pair presented twice, with each presentation 
separated by the supraliminal presentation of a left or right arrow to which participants were 
required to respond by pressing the corresponding key.  Thus a trial would consist of: fixation cross 
(1000 ms), mask 1 (300 ms), colour word 1 (subliminal threshold duration), mask 2 (300 ms), 
colour word 2 (subliminal threshold duration), mask 3 (300 ms), left or right arrow (600 ms), 
repeated twice for two different pairs of colour words i.e. four sequences in total. After the full 
sequence participants were required to indicate if they had been able to make out a word.  If a word 
was correctly identified the word duration was further reduced by a single screen refresh.  The 
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program proceeded to the next stage only when the full sequence had been completed six times 
without a colour word being detected. 
Stage 3, familiarisation with the profession categorisation.  The procedure was identical to 
that of Experiment 1 with the exception that the professions were presented visually for each 
categorisation trial rather than verbally. That is, they performed speeded classifications of visual 
presentations of each profession name as either creative or non-creative.  Each of the professions 
were presented three times in different random orders. 
Stage 4, test stage.  The procedure for each test-trial included visual equivalents of the same 
two stages comprising test-trials in Experiment 1.  In the first phase participants performed the 
attention task, as described in Stage 2 above, while two name-profession pairs were presented 
subliminally (repeated twice).  The timing of the presentations was identical to that of the colour 
word pairs describe in stage 2 namely: fixation cross (1000 ms), mask 1 (300 ms), name (subliminal 
threshold duration), mask 2 (300 ms), profession (subliminal threshold duration), mask 3 (300 ms), 
left or right arrow (600 ms), repeated twice for each of the two different name-profession pairs, i.e. 
four sequences in total. This was again followed by a test of awareness with participants asked to 
indicate using ‘y’ or ‘n’ if they had been able to make out a word.  If they indicated perceiving a 
word the trial was excluded from analysis and the display duration reduced by a further screen 
refresh (16.67 ms).  In the second phase participants had to perform the timed classification of a 
supraliminal profession name; one of the two which had been subliminally presented. This 
classification proceeded in the same manner as Stage 3 above with the exception that each 
profession name was preceded by the supraliminal visual presentation of one of the two male names 
included in the subliminal presentation; the name was presented for 300 ms in greyscale value 0.9 
followed by a blank screen for 200 ms before the profession name started to appear.  The profession 
name was initially presented in very low contrast (greyscale value 0.995, where 1 = white) and 
faded up to a contrast of 0.9 over a period of 950 ms, with increments occurring on every third 
screen refresh (50 ms).  The delay between prime and target was purposely long with the aim of 
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creating an effect in the same direction as that which had been observed in the auditory paradigm 
i.e. inverse priming. 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Pre-processing and exclusion criteria 
Participants and trials were excluded according to the same criteria as in Experiment 1.   
Participants were excluded where they perceived stimuli intended to be subliminal on greater than 
25% of trials (N = 3), or where their mean difference in reaction times for concordant and 
discordant pairs was identified as an outlier by the SPSS boxplot function (N = 2).  A total of 5 
participants were excluded.  Individual trials were excluded where the participant reported detecting 
(in this case seeing) a word that resembled any word intended to be subliminal on that trial (M = 
4.4%, SD = 5.7%), where the profession classification decision was incorrect (M = 8.4%, SD = 
7.0%), or where the RT was shorter than 200 ms or greater than 2 SDs from the mean (M = 5.0%, 
SD = 2.1%).  Overall, the mean percentage of excluded trials was 16.8% (SD = 8.7%).  The RT data 
was again subjected to a reciprocal transformation. The representation of H1 for the Bayes factor 
was based on the effect size from Experiment 1; i.e. a Normal with a mean of zero and an SD set to 
the transformed mean difference (2.62 × 10-5). 
3.3.2 Analysis  
The mean subliminal threshold was 133 ms (SE = 14 ms), consistent with our strategy of 
using low contrast word stimuli with high contrast masks to permit longer exposures without 
resulting in conscious perception.  The mean reaction times for concordant test-trials were longer 
than those of discordant test-trials, t(54) = 2.68, p = .010, dz = 0.36, BN(0, 2.62×10
-5
) = 5.86, see Figure 
2b.  The direction of the difference was again consistent with inverse priming.     
3.4 Conclusion Experiment 2 
The unconscious associative learning observed in the auditory modality in Experiment 1 was 
replicated in the visual modality in Experiment 2. 
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4. Experiment 3 
4.1 Rationale 
Experiments 1 and 2 found reliable evidence for unconscious associative learning in the 
auditory and visual modalities respectively. Experiment 3 therefore sought to evaluate whether 
unconscious associative learning could be achieved cross-modally between auditory and visual 
stimuli.  The experimental design was adapted such that names were presented in the auditory 
modality and professions in the visual modality; any unconscious associative learning would thus 
require cross-modal binding.  Because learning was observed in each modality independently, either 
the presence or reliable absence of learning in this cross-modal experiment would be informative.  
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Participants 
Participants included 60 volunteers (34 female) with a mean age of 22 (SD = 5.6) recruited 
by direct approach on the University of Sussex campus.  Volunteers participated in exchange for 
confectionary.  All participants were native English speakers reporting both normal or corrected to 
normal vision and normal binaural hearing.  All participants were naïve to the experimental 
hypothesis.   
4.2.2 Materials 
Materials were identical to those used in Experiments 1 and 2.  The word stimuli used in the 
test trials consisted of the 32 spoken names as used in Experiment 1 and the 16 visually presented 
professions as used in Experiment 2. 
4.2.3 Procedure 
The study was conducted in a quiet room with the experimenter present at all times.  The 
procedure consisted of five stages following the same format as Experiments 1 and 2.  
Stage 1, visual threshold identification.  This stage established the visual threshold using the 
same stimuli and procedure as Stage 1 of Experiment 2.  
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Stage 2, auditory threshold identification.  This stage established the auditory threshold 
using a simplified version of the procedure used in Stage 1 of Experiment 1. The colour words were 
presented alone rather than embedded in a sequence of number words. 
Stage 3, familiarisation with an attentional task.  This stage introduced an attentional task of 
the same form as used in Experiment 2 with one key difference; where in Experiment 2 the pairs of 
words were presented visually here the first word in each pair was presented auditorily (at the 
identified subliminal threshold) and the second word presented visually (at the identified subliminal 
threshold). Thus each trial consisted of the following sequence: Fixation cross (1000 ms), first mask 
presented while word 1 was spoken (duration of the spoken word, > 600 ms), word 2 visually 
presented (subliminal threshold duration), second mask (duration of the spoken word), left or right 
arrow (600 ms), repeated twice for two different pairs of colour words i.e. four sequences in total. 
After the full sequence, participants were required to indicate if they had either heard or seen a word 
using the ‘y’ and ‘n’ key in each case.  If they indicated hearing or seeing a word the corresponding 
threshold (volume or presentation duration) was adjusted as in Experiments 1 and 2. The program 
only proceeded to the next stage when the participant had reported being unable to hear or see any 
words on six consecutive trials. 
Stage 4, familiarisation with the profession categorisation.  The procedure for familiarising 
with the profession categorisation task was identical to that of Experiment 2 i.e. professions were 
presented visually for speeded classification.  
Stage 5, test stage.  The procedure for each test-trial included a combination of the auditory 
and visual equivalents of the same two phases used in Experiments 1 and 2. In the first phase 
participants were required to perform the attention task as described in Stage 3 above.  The 
subliminal stimuli included two different name-profession pairs (one including a creative profession 
and one an uncreative profession) with the names presented auditorily (at the identified subliminal 
threshold) and the professions visually (at the identified subliminal threshold); each pair was 
repeated twice.  This was again followed by a test of awareness to ensure that trials were excluded 
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where stimuli were consciously perceived and permitting the display duration or volume to be 
further adjusted if necessary.  The second phase of each test-trial was identical to that of 
Experiment 2 with the exception that the name prime occurring prior to the profession was 
presented auditorily rather than visually and the target profession was not faded up but presented in 
greyscale 0.9 from the outset.  
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Pre-processing and exclusion criteria 
Participants and trials were excluded according to the same criteria as the previous 
experiments.  Participants were excluded where they perceived (either heard or saw) stimuli 
intended to be subliminal on greater than 25% of trials (N = 0), or where their mean difference in 
reaction times for concordant and discordant pairs was identified as an outlier using the SPSS 
boxplot function (N = 0).  Individual trials were excluded where the participant reported detecting 
(in this case seeing or hearing) a word that resembled any word intended to be subliminal on that 
trial (M = 0.6%, SD = 2.0%), where the profession classification decision was incorrect (M = 8.0%, 
SD = 7.6%), or where the RT was shorter than 200 ms or greater than 2 SDs from the mean (M = 
5.0%, SD = 2.4%).  Overall, the mean percentage of excluded trials was 13.1% (SD = 8.4%).  The 
RT data was again subjected to a reciprocal transformation. The Bayes factor was calculated in 
exactly the same way as for Experiment 2. 
4.3.2 Analysis  
The mean subliminal threshold for the visual stimuli was 178 ms (SE = 17 ms), again 
consistent with the low contrast word stimuli combined with high contrast masks permitting longer 
exposures without conscious perception.  The mean reaction times for concordant test-trials were 
significantly longer than those of discordant test-trials, t(59) = 2.56, p = .013, dz = 0.33, BN(0, 2.62×10
-
5
) = 6.27 see Figure 2c.  The direction of the difference was again consistent with inverse priming.   
In each of Experiment 1, 2, and 3, test trials were excluded if the participant reported seeing 
or hearing a word that even remotely resembled any word intended to be subliminal on that trial.  
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We hold this to be a suitably sensitive approach for excluding cases of conscious awareness, 
however a still more stringent criterion might exclude any trial where the participant believed that 
they saw or heard a word irrespective of whether what they reported in any way resembled the 
subliminal stimulus.  Conducting this additional analysis revealed the same pattern of results with a 
difference in concordant versus discordant reaction times again achieved in all three experiments: 
Auditory, t(57) = 2.67, p = .010, dz = .34, BN(0, 2.62×10
-5
) = 7.93; Visual, t(54) = 2.19, p = .033, dz = 
.29, BN(0, 2.62×10
-5
) = 2.47; Cross-Modal, t(59) = 2.55, p = .013, dz = .31, BN(0, 2.62×10
-5
) = 6.18. 
 
4.4 Conclusion Experiment 3 
The associative learning observed between subliminal stimuli in the auditory and visual 
modalities independently was replicated where the associated stimuli were presented in alternate 
modalities.  Experiment 3 therefore provides evidence for unconscious associative learning of novel 
stimulus pairs between auditory and visual modalities.   
 
5. Experiment 4 
5.1 Rationale 
Experiment 3 demonstrated that subliminal stimuli presented in two different modalities can 
become associated.  The fact that such associations can be achieved without conscious perception 
raises the question as to what advantage conscious perception provides; specifically, might the 
associations acquired be stronger than those from unconscious exposure?   Experiment 4 sought to 
evaluate this by replicating Experiment 3 with the crucial change that the stimuli would now be 
presented supraliminally.  For auditory stimuli this was achieved by individually identifying a 
volume where participants could reliably identify the stimuli.  For visual stimuli we sought to keep 
the duration of exposure approximately equal to the average exposure duration used in Experiments 
2 and 3, while achieving conscious perception by adjusting the contrast i.e. presenting the words in 
black on a white background rather than presenting them in grey as in the previous Experiments.  
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Our prediction was that under conscious conditions the same direction of effect would be attained 
i.e. negative priming, but that the size of the effect would be greater due to stronger associations 
between names and professions. 
5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Participants 
Participants included 60 volunteers (37 female) with a mean age of 23 (SD = 3.6) recruited 
by direct approach on the University of Sussex campus.  Volunteers participated in exchange for 
confectionary.  All participants were native English speakers reporting both normal or corrected to 
normal vision and normal binaural hearing.  All participants were naïve to the experimental 
hypothesis.   
5.2.2 Materials 
Materials were identical to those used in Experiment 3. 
5.2.3 Procedure 
The study was conducted in a quiet room with the experimenter present at all times.  The 
procedure was the same as Experiment 3 with the following key exceptions.  The visual words were 
presented in black, rather than grey, on a white background.  This was done in an attempt to permit 
conscious perception while keeping the duration roughly equivalent to the mean duration in the 
previous subliminal experiments.  The two threshold finding stages were adapted to ensure the 
stimuli were supraliminal rather than subliminal.  The visual threshold task started with an initial 
exposure duration of 150ms and this duration only increased if participants were unable to reliably 
identify the words.  The threshold was considered to have been established once they had accurately 
reported the words on six consecutive trials at the established duration.  The auditory threshold task 
similarly involved increasing the volume of the words until participants accurately reported them on 
six consecutive trials at the established volume. 
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Pre-processing and exclusion criteria 
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Unlike the previous Experiments the stimuli were intentionally presented above the 
conscious threshold and as such there were no exclusions based on their unintended perception.  In 
all other respects the pre-processing and exclusion criteria were applied as before.  Participants 
were excluded where the mean difference in reaction times for concordant and discordant pairs was 
identified as an outlier using the SPSS boxplot function (N = 3).  Individual trials were excluded 
where the profession classification decision was incorrect (M = 12.5%, SD = 9.3%), or where the 
RT was shorter than 200 ms or greater than 2 SDs from the mean (M = 5.6%, SD = 3.3%).  Overall, 
the mean percentage of excluded trials was 17.3% (SD = 9.8%). 
5.3.2 Analysis  
The mean exposure time for the visual stimuli was 151 ms (SE = 0.73 ms), closely 
approximating the mean exposure time in the subliminal experiments.  In contrast to those 
experiments however, the mean reaction times for concordant test-trials were not significantly 
longer than those of discordant test-trials, t(56) = 0.21, p = .833, dz = 0.03, BN(0, 2.62×10
-5
) =   0.66 see 
Figure 2d.  The Bayes Factor of 0.66, being both less than 3 and greater than 1/3rd, indicates that the 
analysis lacked sensitivity and thus prevents any strong conclusions regarding the failure to observe 
significant learning. 
To explore how the approach to learning may have differed from that adopted with 
subliminal stimuli we contrasted the reaction times and percentage of classification errors made in 
the present supraliminal paradigm with those of the equivalent subliminal version (Experiment 3), 
see Figure 3.  The mean classification reaction time in the present study was shorter than that of the 
subliminal equivalent, t(115) = 6.40, p < .001, d = 1.18, BN(0, 2.62×10
-5
) = 18.18 , and a greater 
percentage of classification errors were made, t(108.34) = 2.88, p = .005, d = 0.55, BN(0, 3.03)  = 9.30.  
The larger proportion of errors will have reduced the power to detect an effect in the present study 
by increasing the number of excluded trials.  The combination of shorter reaction times and greater 
classification errors clearly indicates that participants performed the task differently in the presence 
of supraliminal versus subliminal stimuli.  It seems plausible that participants were attempting to 
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consciously anticipate the required classification responses based on their knowledge of how the 
primes had previously been paired with professions; something that was not possible in the 
subliminal conditions.  However, given that precisely half of the targets in the test phase were 
deliberately discordant with their prime overall such anticipatory responses will have reduced 
classification accuracy, i.e. producing a speed accuracy trade off. 
 
Figure 3.  Mean reaction times and percentage of profession classification judgements which were incorrect 
i.e. creative professions classified as uncreative or vice versa, for the subliminal (Experiment 3) and 
supraliminal (Experiment 4) cross-modal experiments (+/- 1 SEM).  Exp. 3, N = 60; Exp. 4, N = 57.  
* p < .05. 
 
5.4 Conclusion Experiment 4 
Experiment 4 demonstrated that conscious perception of the stimuli changes the approach to 
performing this task.  In the presence of supraliminal stimuli participants responded significantly 
faster, and made significantly more classification errors.  A plausible explanation is that participants 
were unable to avoid anticipating the classification judgments based on their conscious knowledge 
of the prior pairing between the names and professions.   
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6. Experiment 5 
6.1 Rationale 
The paradigm adopted in the previous experiments utilised word-based stimuli; either 
written or spoken words.   Words were chosen both for the ease of adapting the same paradigm to 
auditory and visual modalities, and for the likely strength of verbal concepts.  The stronger a given 
concept the more readily it can support associations (Anderson, 1983; McLaren & Mackintosh, 
2000; Scott & Dienes, 2010), therefore adopting highly familiar words was desirable so as to 
maximise the likelihood of learning.  However, the use of words does limit the generalizability of 
our findings.  In educated adults, where reading is a highly practiced skill, written words 
automatically generate phonetic representations and to a lesser extent spoken words prime visual 
representations of the written equivalent (Perre, Pattamadilok, Montant, & Ziegler, 2009).  As such, 
while Experiment 3 demonstrated that new associations can be formed between subliminal stimuli 
presented in two different modalities this could conceivably be limited to situations where those 
stimuli have a pre-existing automatically generated representation in the opposing modality.  
Experiment 5 sought to evaluate this possibility by adapting the paradigm to use non-linguistic 
stimuli.   
6.2 Method 
6.2.1 Participants 
Participants included 60 volunteers (42 female) with a mean age of 24 (SD = 6.1) recruited 
by direct approach on the University of Sussex campus.  Volunteers participated in exchange for 
confectionary.  All participants were native English speakers reporting both normal or corrected to 
normal vision and normal binaural hearing.  All participants were naïve to the experimental 
hypothesis.   
6.2.2 Materials 
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Sequences of 12 non-alphanumeric symbols took the place of the written professions used in 
the test phase of the linguistic experiments.  Eight of the sequences were asymmetrical e.g. 
‘[[[[]]]]----’ and eight were symmetrical e.g. ‘[[[[----]]]]’.  All symbols were 
presented in Courier New font style, font size 25, as was used for the profession names in the 
previous experiments.  Symbol sequences were also employed in the threshold finding task where 
they were either made up entirely of one symbol e.g. e.g. ‘]]]]]]]]]]]]’ or were made up of 
two symbols e.g. ‘]]]]]]++++++’.  None of the sequences used in the threshold finding task 
were used in the test phase.   
Auditory sequences of four tones took the place of the spoken names used in the linguistic 
experiments.  The tone frequencies were 220.00 Hz (A3), 246.94 Hz (B3), 261.63 Hz (C4), and 
293.66 Hz (D4).  Tone sequences consisted of randomly ordered sets of four tones, always 
including at least two different tones.  Tones were 300 ms in duration each separated by a 20 ms 
silence.  None of the tone sequences used in the threshold finding task were used in the test phase.  
In addition, symmetrical tone sequences were excluded from the test phase.   
A full list of the tone sequences and symbol sequences used in both the threshold finding 
task and the test phase is provided in Appendix B. 
6.2.3 Procedure 
The procedure consisted of the same five stages as the linguistic equivalent (Experiment 3) 
with minor alterations due to the change of stimuli.  
Stage 1, visual threshold identification.  This stage established the visual threshold 
following the same procedure as Experiment 3 with one minor exception. Rather than being asked 
whether a word or non-word had been displayed participants were asked whether the sequence of 
symbols had been made up of one type or two types of symbol.  Participants were then asked to 
report if they had some confidence in that judgment or whether it was a complete guess.  If they 
were accurate in their judgement and reported some confidence then the display duration was 
shortened following the same procedure as in the previous experiments.  As before, their threshold 
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of awareness was considered to have been found when they reported having no confidence on 6 
consecutive trials.  
Stage 2, auditory threshold identification.  Because the tone sequences are more readily 
discernible than spoken words the subliminal presentation of tone sequences made use of a white 
noise mask. The white noise was set at a constant volume (approximately 68 dBc), preceded the 
tone sequence by 100 ms and continued until 100 ms after the tone sequence had ended.  The 
volume of the tone sequences (native sound file volume of 77 dBc) was adjusted in the same way as 
in the previous Experiments.  Specifically, the volume was first increased on each trial by .0005 
times the native sound file volume until the participant was able to confidently report whether the 
last two tones of a given sequence were the same.  On subsequent trials the volume was then 
systematically reduced by the same multiple on each trial until the participant was unable to report 
whether the last two tones were the same.  Their threshold of awareness was considered to have 
been found when they reported having no confidence on 6 consecutive trials.  
Stage 3, familiarisation with an attentional task.  This stage introduced the same attentional 
task as used in Experiment 3 with minor changes relating to the stimuli.  Each trial consisted of two 
symbol sequences – tone sequence pairs, each repeated twice.  One of each pair always included a 
symmetrical symbol sequence and the other an asymmetrical symbol sequence.  The stimuli 
presentation was as follows: Fixation cross (1000 ms), mask (presented while the tone-sequence 
was played, duration 1460 ms), symbol sequence (for the subliminal threshold duration), mask 
(duration 1460 ms), left or right arrow (600 ms), repeated twice for each of the two different pairs. 
Participants were required to press the arrow key corresponding to the direction of the arrow and 
error tones were generated for delayed or incorrect responses as before.  After the full sequence was 
complete (each pair had been presented twice) participants were asked to indicate if they had seen 
any symbol sequences (y/n), and whether they had heard any tone sequences (y/n).  If they reported 
having seen or heard any sequences the display duration or volume was reduced in the same manner 
as in each of the previous Experiments; no attempt was made to establish the accuracy of their 
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perceptions.  The program only proceeded to the next stage when the participant had reported being 
unable to see or hear any sequences on six consecutive trials. 
Stage 4, familiarisation with the symmetry categorisation.  The procedure for familiarising 
with the symmetry categorisation followed the same procedure as that for the profession 
categorisation in the previous experiments.  On-screen instructions provided two lists of symbol 
sequences; eight symmetrical and eight asymmetrical, see Appendix B.  Participants studied the 
lists before beginning the reaction time task. On each trial, one of the 16 symbol sequences was 
presented onscreen with the participant required to indicate whether it was symmetrical or 
asymmetrical using the left or right arrow key respectively. The trials included all 16 symbol 
sequences repeated three times in different random orders. The need for both speed and accuracy 
was again emphasised and a dynamic display showed the participant’s fastest reaction time so far 
and the number of errors made, as before.  
Stage 5, test stage.  The procedure for each test-trial was identical to that of Experiment 3 
with the exception that the auditory names and written professions were replaced with the tone 
sequences and symbol sequences respectively.  
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Pre-processing and exclusion criteria 
Participants and trials were excluded according to the same criteria as the previous 
experiments. Participants were excluded where they perceived stimuli intended to be subliminal on 
greater than 25% of trials (N = 5), or where the mean difference in reaction times for concordant 
and discordant pairs was identified as an outlier using the SPSS boxplot function (N = 3).  A total of 
8 participants were excluded.  Individual trials were excluded where the participant reported 
perceiving (in this case seeing or hearing) any stimuli intended to be subliminal (6.3%), where the 
classification decision was incorrect (14.7%), or where the RT was shorter than 200 ms or greater 
than 2 SDs from the mean (4.3%).  In total 24.0% of trials were excluded.  The RT data was again 
subjected to a reciprocal transformation. 
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6.3.2 Analysis  
The mean subliminal threshold for the visual stimuli was 64 ms (SE = 4.7 ms).  The mean 
reaction times for concordant test-trials were longer than those of discordant test-trials, t(51) = 1.94, 
p = .029 (one-tailed), dz = 0.27, BN(0, 2.62×10
-5
) = 2.05,  see Figure 2e.  Note that the direction of the 
difference in RTs for concordant versus discordant pairs was consistent in all four of the prior 
experiments.   
 
6.4 Conclusion Experiment 5 
Experiment 5 replicates the unconscious cross-modal binding observed in Experiment 3 and 
extends that result to novel pairs of non-linguistic stimuli, thus demonstrating that it is not reliant on 
stimuli having a pre-existing automatically generated representation in the opposing modality.  
Notably, associations were formed despite the novel stimuli inevitably having weaker individual 
representations than the linguistic stimuli used in the previous experiments. 
 
7. General Discussion 
Our results demonstrate associative learning of novel combinations of subliminally presented 
stimuli both within the same modality and crucially between two different modalities.  The 
observed effects were of a comparable size and showed a consistent pattern in each of the four 
subliminal experiments.  The results of Experiments 1 and 2 replicate previous research findings 
showing the acquisition of associations between unconsciously perceived stimuli presented within a 
single modality (Atas, et al., 2014; Duss, et al., 2011; Henke, et al., 2013).  This was then extended 
to cross-modal associations between audition and vision; in Experiment 3 this was demonstrated 
with linguistic stimuli and in Experiment 5 it was replicated with non-linguistic stimuli. Experiment 
4 found that conscious perception of the stimuli changed participants’ approach to the task, with 
conscious anticipation seemingly interfering with the accuracy of classification judgements.  
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In each of the subliminal experiments the time taken to classify a target was significantly longer 
when preceded by a prime with which it had been subliminally paired than when preceded by a 
prime that had been paired with a target requiring the opposite classification.  This inverse priming, 
occurring in the absence of masking, is consistent with prior literature exploring the negative 
compatibility effect, (NCE; Jaskowski, 2008; Machado, et al., 2007; Sumner, 2008).  In relation to 
the NCE, the key differences between our paradigm and that of, for example, Machado et al., is that 
in the experiments presented here the response associated with the prime was unconsciously 
acquired, and the prime and target were sometimes presented in different sensory modalities.  Both 
the delay between prime and target and the magnitude of the observed difference in reaction times 
are, however, directly comparable. 
Where the findings of Faivre, Mudrik, Schwartz, and Koch (2014) demonstrate integration 
through the reactivation of a consciously acquired association, the present results extend this to 
include the acquisition of new associations.  This imposes a strong constraint on theories of 
consciousness.  In particular, our results challenge what we call integration theories of 
consciousness: any theory that is committed to the Conscious Access Hypothesis (or CAH; Baars 
2002).  The CAH can be expressed as the conjunction of the following claims: 
1. There are numerous distinct processing areas/brain functions that are normally separate and 
independent; and 
2. Consciousness is required for integration of these areas. 
Note that integration theories, as we use the term, assert that consciousness is necessary for 
integration; theories that merely claim that consciousness is sufficient for integration are consistent 
with our findings. 
In its strongest, unrestricted form, the CAH denies all informational/functional integration of 
distinct processing areas in the absence of consciousness.  But since there are several senses of the 
term “integration” relevant to theories of consciousness, there are correspondingly weaker 
integration theories that only claim the necessity of consciousness for some, but not all, of these 
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kinds of integration.  A recent review (Mudrik, et  al., 2014) identifies four claims corresponding to 
four dimensions along which the CAH may be weakened: 
 Claim 1: consciousness is necessary for long-range but not short-range spatiotemporal 
integration 
  Claim 2: consciousness is necessary for high-level but not low-level semantic integration 
  Claim 3: consciousness is necessary for multisensory integration 
  Claim 4: consciousness is necessary for novel but not for previously learned integration 
 
It is worth noting, then, that our results challenge not just the strongest, unrestricted version of 
the CAH, but also some of the weaker claims just described: 
 
 Claim 2, one could argue, is challenged by experiments 1, 2, 3 and 5, in that they 
demonstrate unconscious semantic processing that goes beyond mere categorical knowledge 
by involving conceptual knowledge and associative learning.  However, evaluation of this 
issue requires careful consideration of the high-level vs. low-level semantic processing 
distinction, which is not our goal here, nor were our experiments designed for this purpose. 
 Claim 3, however is clearly challenged by experiments 3 and 5, in that they demonstrate 
unconscious integration of the auditory and visual modalities. 
 Claim 4 is challenged by experiments 1, 2 and 3.  Further, experiment 5 challenges Claim 4 
using non-linguistic stimuli, specifically to address the concerns of those who suspect that 
pre-existing associations between auditory and visual representations of words in 
experiments 1, 2 and 3 might somehow allow an interpretation of what subjects are doing in 
those experiments that falls short of learning new cross-modal associations. 
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Global Workspace Theory (Baars 1998; hereafter “GWT”) is the paradigmatic example of an 
integration theory, which should come as no surprise, given that the author of the CAH, in terms of 
which we are defining integration theories, is also the originator of GWT.  According to GWT, 
perceptual signals are first processed in (and confined to) modality-specific, localised areas of the 
brain.  When signals remain localised, the associated sensations are not perceived consciously.  It is 
only when a signal wins access to the global workspace and is thereby broadcast to a wider network 
of neurons across much of the cortex that it can be integrated with signals in another modality area.  
Thus, according to GWT, “consciousness is needed to integrate multiple sensory inputs”  (Baars, 
2002). 
Putting the point another way, according to GWT, processing dependent on the broadcast to 
a wider network should not occur without conscious awareness. In particular, integration of sensory 
modalities is dependent on broadcast in this way.  Thus, GWT asserts that processing dependent on 
inputs in more than one sensory modality can only occur if there is conscious awareness of the input 
in at least one of the involved modalities.  It follows that, according to GWT, unconscious cross-
modal associative learning should not be possible, a point which does not seem to have been missed 
by the author of GWT himself, who explicitly claims that unconscious input processing is limited to 
sensory regions (Baars, 2002). 
This way of applying the CAH to cross-modal sensory integration is not unique to Baars.  A 
comparable view is put forward in (Palmer and Ramsey 2012, p 363): 
 
"At least in the domain of multisensory integration, our results suggest a simple yet fundamental 
principle regarding the function of consciousness – cross-modal effects can occur in the absence of 
consciousness, but the influencing modality must be consciously perceived for its information to 
cross modalities.” 
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Indeed, prior to the results presented here, there was no empirical basis for questioning these 
views; (Mudrik, Faivre & Koch 2014) report that no study to date has observed cross-modal 
integration in awake subjects (p 493): 
 
“Thus far, it has only been shown that the processing of an invisible stimulus is affected by the 
processing of congruent and incongruent consciously perceived stimuli in the auditory, tactile, 
proprioceptive, or olfactory modalities. This, by itself, can be accommodated within the global 
access hypothesis: information about the supraliminal stimulus spreads to all modules, including 
the unconsciously activated visual one, enabling its comparison with the invisible stimulus. Thus, 
only an experiment where both stimuli are unconsciously presented can truly probe unconscious 
MIW [multisensory integration windows]. Such unconscious integration of tones and odors was 
reported during sleep, when unconscious association of these stimuli produced behavioral 
conditioning.  However, no study to date has manipulated awareness of multimodal stimuli in 
awake subjects, where stringent measures of awareness can be obtained.” 
 
However, our studies have made precisely this manipulation, and thus question the general 
integrationist picture expressed by the researchers quoted above. 
Rather than leave the issue there, it is worth considering how integration theorists might 
proceed in the light of our findings.  Giving up on the Conscious Access Hypothesis would be a 
high price to pay for theories such as GWT in which the CAH is central, possibly leading to 
rejection of GWT itself.  Are there alternative responses?    
Alternatives could come in one of two forms:  either push back, by somehow denying the 
data presented here or the implications we have drawn from them; or attempt to accommodate our 
results by modifying the CAH and/or theories based on it, such as GWT. 
An example of the former line of response would be to challenge our interpretation of the data by 
rejecting the subjective criterion for consciousness that our studies employ. Specifically, one could 
39 
 
challenge our assumption that lack of reportability implies lack of consciousness.  Although this 
may be a feasible, even attractive possibility for some theorists (e.g., Lamme, 2010), it is not a 
viable option for GWT.  Specifically, the notion of unreportable conscious experience is prima facie 
inconsistent with GWT, since at the heart of that theory is the idea that consciousness implies 
availability to all modules, including the speech/reporting systems.   
We have already blocked another way some might be tempted to set aside the results of 
Experiment 3: claiming that CAH does not apply because of the linguistic stimuli used.  The idea 
would be that linguistic stimuli constitute a special case, since with linguistic stimuli, there are pre-
learned (“routine”) associations between the visual and phonetic representations: a kind of multi-
sensory integration (Singer 1998; Dehaene 2014).  This, it might be proposed, is what gives the 
appearance of unconscious cross-modal learning of novel associations.  But again, such a move is 
not in the spirit of integration theories such as GWT:  “Consciousness is needed to integrate 
multiple sensory inputs, presumably by mobilizing specialized functions like syntax, semantics, 
high-level visual knowledge, problem solving and decision making” (Baars 1992, p 48, emphasis 
added).  Nevertheless, we did consider the question worth asking: were the results observed in 
Experiment 3 limited to linguistic stimuli?  Experiment 5 was designed to ask this question, and the 
answer was “no”. 
If pushing back on our results is not a viable option for the integration theorist, what about 
altering integration theories to accommodate our findings?  Note that although our experiments 
demonstrate unconscious multisensory integration, they do not demonstrate unconscious global 
access.  Specifically, the subliminal perceptual information (and learned associations involving that 
information) cannot be accessed by introspective/reporting systems.  Accordingly, it might be 
tempting for integration theorists to accommodate our results by retaining the connection between 
consciousness and global accessibility, but allowing that there can be multisensory integration 
without global access.  This seems like a reasonable move, but again it is unclear whether such a 
change can be made without undermining much of the empirical support that has been offered for 
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integration theories.  Specifically, one GWT empirical strategy is to emphasize the normal 
independence and isolation of, e.g., sensory modules, and enshrine global broadcast as the sole 
means of overcoming this encapsulation, so that any evidence of integration would thereby also be 
evidence of global access and thus consciousness.  Another, more serious, problem with the 
proposed revision to GWT is this:  If unconscious “partial broadcast” (sharing information across 
module boundaries in the absence of consciousness) is possible, what stops unconscious 
information being shared with the introspection/reporting systems?  A virtue of GWT as it stands is 
that it can give a principled explanation for why consciousness and reportability go hand in hand.  
Once partial broadcast is permitted, there is no longer an explanation in place for why unconscious 
items cannot be reported.  To work, this line of accommodation would require a substantial addition 
to GWT as it stands. 
Another accommodating approach is to retain an emphasis on integration being central to 
consciousness, but reject the CAH, the idea that consciousness is required for integration, as the 
way to capture that centrality.  That is, an integration theorist could look for something other than 
“making integration possible” as the primary role for consciousness.  A conservative way of doing 
this would be to move from the categorical to the probabilistic.  Thus, consciousness doesn’t make 
integration “possible”, just “more likely”.   
But if we have to withdraw the integrationist hypotheses that consciousness is primarily 
about making integration possible or probable, what can we put in their place?  One way to move 
on from integrationist theories as they stand is this hypothesis:  consciousness enables information 
(integrated or not) to be more structured/more flexibly deployed.  In particular, it might be that 
consciousness allows information to be used in a wider range of contexts, or over a longer temporal 
scale; it might facilitate representations with more sophisticated logical structure, variables, etc.; or 
it might permit higher-order informational states.  None of these are supported by our data, but we 
mention them here for those wondering where to turn if the integrationist view is abandoned. 
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We close our discussion with some remarks about method.  While previous studies have 
found evidence for unconscious associative learning within individual modalities, even that more 
straightforward objective has proved challenging.  It is therefore worth considering what aspects of 
the current design may have contributed to its success.  We initially exploited linguistic stimuli 
reasoning that, in keeping with associative theories of perceptual learning (e.g. McLaren & 
Mackintosh, 2000), the strong individual representations would facilitate the formation of 
associations between stimuli (Scott & Dienes, 2010).  Only in Experiment 5 did we move away 
from word stimuli, where this was done specifically to evaluate whether our result would generalise 
beyond linguistic stimuli for which there is a pre-existing automatically generated representation in 
the opposing modality.  All familiar stimuli are typically given a name of some form, so the desire 
to avoid linguistic tags necessitated the use of novel stimuli.  While the expectation was that using 
novel stimuli would reduce the likelihood of associations being acquired, in the event, the 
replication proved successful despite the novelty of the stimuli used. 
Another important aspect of our design is the trial-by-trial test of awareness; subliminal 
thresholds were identified for each individual and tested throughout the experiment.  We anticipated 
that taking advantage of individual differences in perceptual thresholds in this way, rather than 
applying an arbitrarily low threshold to all participants, would maximise the likelihood of 
unconscious learning.  Importantly, the results remained robust even excluding any test trial where a 
participant thought they had seen or heard a stimulus regardless of their ability to report it. A related 
feature of the design involved the use of a method previously found to be effective in subliminal 
word presentation (Armstrong & Dienes, 2013; Lamy, et al., 2008) whereby word stimuli are 
presented in low contrast.  It has been suggested that the capacity of unconscious processing may 
have been underestimated in back-masking studies as a result of the short exposure durations, 
typically in the order of 30 ms.  In the present study, subliminally presented word stimuli appeared 
in light grey on a white background preceded and followed by high contrast black and white masks.  
This low-contrast presentation resulted in a mean subjective threshold of approximately 150 ms, 
42 
 
substantially longer than that typically observed using standard masking procedures.  This extended 
unconscious exposure could feasibly have played an important role in aiding the formation of 
associations.  
Finally, our paradigm purposely sought to minimise the time delay between subliminal 
exposure to each stimulus pair and testing of that association.  Each test-trial included a subliminal 
exposure phase, where pairs of stimuli were presented, immediately followed by a test of whether 
an association had been acquired.  This contrasts with more typical designs where multiple 
exposure trials for different stimuli are completed before a sequence of multiple test trials evaluates 
learning.  We anticipate that the short time delay in the present study will have contributed to 
achieving a sensitive test of learning. 
 A recent challenge to GWT is the finding that information can be maintained in working 
memory although presented subliminally (e.g. Soto, Mäntylä, & Silvanto, 2011; King, Pescetelli, 
and Dehaene, 2016).  If working memory is taken to be the global workspace, then the result 
directly contradicts the claim that a mental content being conscious is the content being in the 
global workspace. Soto et al. found that when a Gabor patch was rendered subliminal by subjective 
measures (i.e. a measure of subliminality that would be endorsed by global workspace theory), an 
accurate discrimination could be made five seconds later. The fact that accurate information was 
maintained for so long is the evidence for its being in working memory. While intriguing, one can 
still ask, to what extent do these results really challenge GWT? Stein, Kaiser, & Hesselmann (2016) 
argued that people could make an initial guess on first being exposed to the subliminal stimulus, 
and then keep the guess in working memory as a conscious experience (albeit the experience as of a 
guess). This plausible process would indeed save GWT, because only conscious states need be 
maintained in the workspace to explain the results, despite the stimulus being genuinely subliminal. 
On this line, our challenge to GWT presented in this paper remains an important one.  It should be 
noted, however, that the Stein, Kaiser, & Hesselmann line of argumentation is itself under dispute, 
with both behavioural and neural studies providing evidence against it (Soto & Silvanto, 2016; 
43 
 
Soto, 2017; Trubutschek, Marti, Ojeda, King, Mi, Tsodyks, & Dehaene, 2016).  But even if the 
Stein, Kaiser, & Hesselmann defense of GWT (from the data establishing the working memory 
maintenance of subliminally presented items) fails, the results of the current paper constitute 
independent, novel evidence against GWT. 
Broadly speaking there are two classes of theories which seek to distinguish between 
conscious and unconscious content, integration theories and higher order thought (HOT) theories 
(Seth, Dienes, Cleeremans, Overgaard, & Pessoa, 2008).  Integration theories hold that conscious 
contents are widely available or distributed in the brain and so either directly or indirectly align with 
the conscious access hypothesis.  In contrast, HOT theories hold that a state is conscious when we 
are aware of being in that state (Carruthers, 2000; Rosenthal, 2005).  By this approach conscious 
contents are determined by the presence or absence of the complementary higher-order content 
(HOT) rather than global accessibility (Lau & Rosenthal, 2011; Timmermans, Schilbach, Pasquali, 
& Cleeremans, 2012; Weiskrantz, 1997).  In challenging the global access hypothesis our results 
question the framework adopted in many integration theories but do not directly speak to the 
validity of HOT theories. HOT theories are free to postulate connections between perceptual 
representations in different modalities that occur independently of consciousness. Rosenthal (2010) 
postulates that independently of any mental state being conscious, one is aware of objects by sound 
by an auditory quality space; and, separately, one is aware of objects by vision with a visual quality 
space. Yet people can learn to calibrate (or integrate) the spaces in ways that do not require 
conscious mental states (p 378). What is needed now on the HOT theory side is the development of 
testable predictions for any constraints on cross-modal unconscious learning. 
The present study has demonstrated that novel associations can be formed between 
unconsciously perceived stimuli presented in different sensory modalities.  This finding directly 
contradicts any account that holds that consciousness is necessary to perform multisensory 
integration and as such presents a challenge to many of the prevailing theories of consciousness that 
embrace this key tenet of the global access hypothesis.  However, our findings should not be taken 
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to indicate that consciousness does not play an important role in integration.  There are a variety of 
ways in which consciousness may make critical contributions to the integration process, for 
example, by permitting associations over greater temporal separation, by integrating in ways that go 
beyond associating, or in ways that facilitate a range of responses. We look forward to further 
conjectures about the role of consciousness as testable and strong as the original global access 
hypothesis. 
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Appendix A: Word stimuli employed in Experiments 1-4 
Auditory threshold 
(Experiments 1, 3 & 5) 
 Visual threshold 
(Experiments 2, 3 & 5) 
 Test-phase 
(Experiments 1, 2, 3 & 5) 
 
Numbers 
 
Colours 
  
Three letter words 
  
Names 
 
Creative 
Professions 
Uncreative 
Professions 
             
One Red  ace dad gum log ply tad  Jack Artist Dentist 
Two Green  act dam gun lot pod tag  Harry Pianist Solicitor 
Three Blue  add day gut low pop tan  Alfie Guitarist Banker 
Four Yellow  age den guy mad pot tap  Joshua Musician Accountant 
Five Orange  ago dew gym man pro tar  James Saxophonist Pilot 
Six Brown  aid did had map pry tax  Lewis Composer Engineer 
Seven Purple  aim die ham mat pub tea  Ryan Painter Plumber 
Eight Pink  air dig has max pun ten  Dylan Illustrator Electrician 
Nine Black  ale dim hat may pup the  Joseph   
Ten White  and dip hay men put tie  Jake   
Eleven   ant dog hem mix rag tin  Max   
Twelve   any dot hen mob ram tip  Tyler   
Thirteen   ape dry her mop ran tit  Ben   
Fourteen   are due hid mud rap toe  Matthew   
Fifteen   ark dug him mug rat ton  Archie   
Sixteen   arm dye hip mum raw too  Riley   
Seventeen   art ear his nab ray top  Oliver   
Eighteen   ash eat hit nag red tot  Charlie   
Nineteen   ask egg hoe nap rib tow  Thomas   
Twenty   ate ego hog net rig toy  Daniel   
Twenty one   axe elf hop new rim try  William   
Twenty two   bad end hot nib rip tub  George   
Twenty three   bag eon how nil rob tug  Ethan   
Twenty four   ban era hug nip rot two  Samuel   
Twenty five   bar eve hum nod row urn  Liam   
Twenty six   bat eye hut not rub use  Jacob   
Twenty seven   bay fab ice now rug van  Callum   
Twenty eight   bed fad icy nub rum vat  Luke   
Twenty nine   bee fag ink nun run vet  Jayden   
Thirty   beg fan inn nut rut wag  Adam   
   bet far ion oak rye wan  Alex   
   bid fat jab oar sad war  Conner   
   big fed jam oat sag was     
   bin fee jar odd sap wax     
   bit fen jaw oil sat way     
   bow few jet old saw web     
   box fib job one say wed     
   boy fig jog orb sea wee     
   bra fin jot our set wet     
   bum fir joy out sew who     
   bun fit jug owe she why     
   bus fix jut owl shy wig     
   but fly keg own sin win     
   buy foe key pad sip wit     
   bye fog kid pal sir woe     
   cab for kit pan sit won     
   can fox lab pat six wow     
   cap fry lad paw ski wry     
   car fun lap pay sky yak     
   cat fur law pea sly yap     
   con gap lay peg sob yes     
   cop gas led pen sod yet     
   cow gay leg pet son you     
   cox gel let pew spa zag     
   coy gem lid pie sty zap     
   cry get lie pig sue zen     
   cup gig lip pin sum zig     
   cut gin lit pip sun zip     
   dab got lob pit tab zoo     
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Appendix B: Non-word stimuli employed in Experiment 5 
 
Auditory threshold  Visual Threshold  Test-Phase 
        
Final 2 same Final 2 diff  One Symbol Two Symbols  Tones Asymmetrical Symmetrical 
         
BDCC ABBA  [[[[[[[[[[[[ [[[[[[******  CADA  [[[[]]]]---- [[[[----]]]] 
DBBB ACCA  ]]]]]]]]]]]] ]]]]]]++++++  ABAA  ===={{{{}}}} {{{{====}}}} 
CADD ADDA  ------------ ------||||||  ADCC  ))))((((**** ))))****(((( 
DDBB BAAB  ============ ======######  CCDD  \\\\////^^^^ \\\\^^^^//// 
ACCC BCCB  ************ ******oooooo  CCCB  ++++}}}}{{{{ }}}}++++{{{{ 
ABCC BDDB  ++++++++++++ ++++++{{{{{{  CBCD  >>>><<<<|||| >>>>||||<<<< 
CACC CAAC  |||||||||||| ||||||}}}}}}  BCBB  ####]]]][[[[ ]]]]####[[[[ 
ADAA CBBC  ############ ######((((((  BAAC  (((())))oooo ((((oooo)))) 
BBDD CDDC  oooooooooooo oooooo))))))  DCDC    
BCDD DAAD  {{{{{{{{{{{{ {{{{{{^^^^^^  DBCA    
BAAA DBBD  }}}}}}}}}}}} }}}}}}<<<<<<  DBBA    
AACC DCCD  (((((((((((( ((((((>>>>>>  DBAC    
BCCC DCDB  )))))))))))) ))))))\\\\\\  DBDD    
ABDD CCCA  ^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^//////  CACA    
ABBB CADB  <<<<<<<<<<<< <<<<<<[[[[[[  AABC    
ACBB BCDC  >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>]]]]]]  DBCC    
ADDD BDAD  \\\\\\\\\\\\ \\\\\\------  CDCD    
DADD BDAB  //////////// //////======  BDDD    
ACDD BBAD  [[[[[[[[[[[[ [[[[[[******  BBCB    
DDCC CBAB  ]]]]]]]]]]]] ]]]]]]++++++  ADCB    
CABB CBDA  ------------ ------||||||  CAAA    
CCBB DCDA  ============ ======######  BACC    
CBBB AABA     BCAA    
CBDD CCDA     BDAC    
BDAA BACB     AADA    
DACC ABCB     ADCA    
DCDD BDCA     ADBC    
CDDD DABD     DDAA    
CCAA DCBD     DBDC    
CDCC BCDA     ADAC    
BBAA DDBD     DCAB    
BDBB DADA     BABA    
BADD CCAB        
ADBB BADB        
CBCC CABC        
AABB CCCD        
CDBB ADCD        
DCAA CCBC        
DABB DACD        
BABB DDAC        
AADD ABCA        
DBAA ACDA        
CBAA ACBC        
BBCC BCCD        
ACAA ADAB        
DCBB DCCB        
DCCC BABD        
CDAA ACAD        
DAAA BCBC        
         
         
  
 
 
